2024-01-18 Thu 15.56pm [[Robert Axelrod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf]] > [!-cf-]+ [[Related notes]] > - Veritasium on Game Theory https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mScpHTIi-kM&ab_channel=Veritasium >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:03:06.743Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:03:06.743Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":6095,"end":6251},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"The soldiers of these opposing small units actually violated ordersfrom their own high commands in order to achieve tacit cooperation witheach other.","prefix":"er for extended periodsof time. ","suffix":"This case illustrates the point "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%er for extended periodsof time.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==The soldiers of these opposing small units actually violated ordersfrom their own high commands in order to achieve tacit cooperation witheach other.== %%POSTFIX%%This case illustrates the point* >%%LINK%%[[#^yqici00vk8l|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^yqici00vk8l >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:03:27.775Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:03:27.775Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":3177,"end":4353},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"To find a good strategy to use in such situations, I invited experts ingame theory to submit programs for a computer Prisoner’s Dilemmatournament – much like a computer chess tournament. Each of thesestrategies was paired off with each of the others to see which would do bestoverall in repeated interactions.Amazingly enough, the winner was the simplest of all candidates sub-mitted. This was a strategy of simple reciprocity which cooperates on thefirst move and then does whatever the other player did on the previousmove. Using an American colloquial phrase, this strategy was named Titfor Tat. A second round of the tournament was conducted in which manymore entries were submitted by amateurs and professionals alike, all ofwhom were aware of the results of the first round. The result was anothervictory for simple reciprocity.The analysis of the data from these tournaments reveals four propertieswhich tend to make a strategy successful: avoidance of unnecessary con-flict by cooperating as long as the other player does, provocability in the","prefix":"rse than if both had cooperated.","suffix":"The Evolution of Cooperation / "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%rse than if both had cooperated.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==To find a good strategy to use in such situations, I invited experts ingame theory to submit programs for a computer Prisoner’s Dilemmatournament – much like a computer chess tournament. Each of thesestrategies was paired off with each of the others to see which would do bestoverall in repeated interactions.Amazingly enough, the winner was the simplest of all candidates sub-mitted. This was a strategy of simple reciprocity which cooperates on thefirst move and then does whatever the other player did on the previousmove. Using an American colloquial phrase, this strategy was named Titfor Tat. A second round of the tournament was conducted in which manymore entries were submitted by amateurs and professionals alike, all ofwhom were aware of the results of the first round. The result was anothervictory for simple reciprocity.The analysis of the data from these tournaments reveals four propertieswhich tend to make a strategy successful: avoidance of unnecessary con-flict by cooperating as long as the other player does, provocability in the== %%POSTFIX%%The Evolution of Cooperation /* >%%LINK%%[[#^rhqunrs4kwc|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^rhqunrs4kwc >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:03:37.222Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:03:37.222Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":4387,"end":4591},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"face of an uncalled-for defection by the other, forgiveness after respondingto a provocation, and clarity of behavior so that the other player canrecognize and adapt to your pattern of action.","prefix":"e Evolution of Cooperation / 3","suffix":"“The soldiers of these opposing "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%e Evolution of Cooperation / 3%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==face of an uncalled-for defection by the other, forgiveness after respondingto a provocation, and clarity of behavior so that the other player canrecognize and adapt to your pattern of action.== %%POSTFIX%%“The soldiers of these opposing* >%%LINK%%[[#^euhcjfxsjgj|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^euhcjfxsjgj >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:03:59.222Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:03:59.222Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":6410,"end":6662},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"In particular, the “live and let live” system demonstrates thatfriendship is hardly necessary for the development of cooperation. Undersuitable conditions, cooperation based upon reciprocity can develop evenbetween antagonists","prefix":" extraordinarily un-promising. ","suffix":".4 / Process of ChangeConditio"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%extraordinarily un-promising.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==In particular, the “live and let live” system demonstrates thatfriendship is hardly necessary for the development of cooperation. Undersuitable conditions, cooperation based upon reciprocity can develop evenbetween antagonists== %%POSTFIX%%.4 / Process of ChangeConditio* >%%LINK%%[[#^zuvul7ln4n|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^zuvul7ln4n >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:05:41.188Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:05:41.188Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":7823,"end":8808},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"For cooperation to emerge, the interaction must extend over an indefinite(or at least an unknown) number of moves, based on the following logic:Two egoists playing the game once will both be tempted to choosedefection since that action does better no matter what action the otherplayer takes. If the game is played a known, finite number of times, theplayers likewise have no incentive to cooperate on the last move, nor on thenext-to-last move since both can anticipate a defection by the other player.Similar reasoning implies that the game will unravel all the way back tomutual defection on the first move. It need not unravel, however, if theplayers interact an indefinite number of times. And in most settings, theplayers cannot be sure when the last interaction between them will takeplace. An indefinite number of interactions, therefore, is a condition underwhich cooperation can emerge.","prefix":"ation] an unprofitablestrategy.”","suffix":"For cooperation to prove stable,"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%ation] an unprofitablestrategy.”%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==For cooperation to emerge, the interaction must extend over an indefinite(or at least an unknown) number of moves, based on the following logic:Two egoists playing the game once will both be tempted to choosedefection since that action does better no matter what action the otherplayer takes. If the game is played a known, finite number of times, theplayers likewise have no incentive to cooperate on the last move, nor on thenext-to-last move since both can anticipate a defection by the other player.Similar reasoning implies that the game will unravel all the way back tomutual defection on the first move. It need not unravel, however, if theplayers interact an indefinite number of times. And in most settings, theplayers cannot be sure when the last interaction between them will takeplace. An indefinite number of interactions, therefore, is a condition underwhich cooperation can emerge.== %%POSTFIX%%For cooperation to prove stable,* >%%LINK%%[[#^fo8dcjp13jb|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^fo8dcjp13jb >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:06:06.509Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:06:06.509Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":8808,"end":9415},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"For cooperation to prove stable, the future must have a sufficiently largeshadow. This means that the importance of the next encounter between thesame two individuals must be great enough to make defection anunprofitable strategy. It requires that the players have a large enoughchance of meeting again and that they do not discount the significance oftheir next meeting too greatly. For example, what made cooperationpossible in the trench warfare of World War I was the fact that the samesmall units from opposite sides of no-man’s-land would be in contact for","prefix":"derwhich cooperation can emerge.","suffix":"The Evolution of Cooperation / "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%derwhich cooperation can emerge.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==For cooperation to prove stable, the future must have a sufficiently largeshadow. This means that the importance of the next encounter between thesame two individuals must be great enough to make defection anunprofitable strategy. It requires that the players have a large enoughchance of meeting again and that they do not discount the significance oftheir next meeting too greatly. For example, what made cooperationpossible in the trench warfare of World War I was the fact that the samesmall units from opposite sides of no-man’s-land would be in contact for== %%POSTFIX%%The Evolution of Cooperation /* >%%LINK%%[[#^gjylb7coitg|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^gjylb7coitg >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:06:12.545Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:06:12.545Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":9449,"end":9575},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"long periods of time, so if one side broke the tacit understandings, then theother side could retaliate against the same unit.","prefix":"e Evolution of Cooperation / 5","suffix":"In order for cooperation to "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%e Evolution of Cooperation / 5%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==long periods of time, so if one side broke the tacit understandings, then theother side could retaliate against the same unit.== %%POSTFIX%%In order for cooperation to* >%%LINK%%[[#^32hmpuanuiw|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^32hmpuanuiw >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:06:43.158Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:06:43.158Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":9575,"end":10288},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"In order for cooperation to get started in the first place, one morecondition is required. The problem is that in a world of unconditionaldefection, a single individual who offers cooperation cannot prosper unlesssome others are around who will reciprocate. On the other hand, cooper-ation can emerge from small clusters of discriminating individuals as longas these individuals have even a small proportion of their interactions witheach other. So there must be some clustering of individuals who usestrategies with two properties: The strategy cooperates on the first move,and discriminates between those who respond to the cooperation and thosewho do not.","prefix":"retaliate against the same unit.","suffix":"“Once the US and the USSR know t"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%retaliate against the same unit.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==In order for cooperation to get started in the first place, one morecondition is required. The problem is that in a world of unconditionaldefection, a single individual who offers cooperation cannot prosper unlesssome others are around who will reciprocate. On the other hand, cooper-ation can emerge from small clusters of discriminating individuals as longas these individuals have even a small proportion of their interactions witheach other. So there must be some clustering of individuals who usestrategies with two properties: The strategy cooperates on the first move,and discriminates between those who respond to the cooperation and thosewho do not.== %%POSTFIX%%“Once the US and the USSR know t* >%%LINK%%[[#^1askojwijjd|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^1askojwijjd >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:08:29.562Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:08:29.562Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":13199,"end":13288},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of therelationship.","prefix":"ho learned to live andlet live.","suffix":" When the conditions are ri"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%ho learned to live andlet live.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of therelationship.== %%POSTFIX%%When the conditions are ri* >%%LINK%%[[#^amvd0rx7mod|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^amvd0rx7mod >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:10:04.252Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:10:04.252Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":13819,"end":14882},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"The Value of ProvocabilityCooperation theory has implications for individual choice as well as forthe design of institutions. Speaking personally, one of my biggest surprisesin working on this project has been the value of provocability and that it isimportant to respond sooner, rather than later. I came to this projectbelieving one should be slow to anger. The results of the computertournament for the Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrate that it is actually betterto respond quickly to a provocation. It turns out that if one waits to respondto uncalled-for defections, there is a risk of sending the wrong signal. Thelonger defections are allowed to go unchallenged, the more likely it is thatthe other player will draw the conclusion that defection can pay. And themore strongly this pattern is established, the harder it will be to break it.The success of simple reciprocity certainly illustrates this point. Byresponding right away, it gives the quickest possible feedback that adefection will not pay.","prefix":"n of cooperation witheach other.","suffix":"The Evolution of Cooperation / "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%n of cooperation witheach other.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==The Value of ProvocabilityCooperation theory has implications for individual choice as well as forthe design of institutions. Speaking personally, one of my biggest surprisesin working on this project has been the value of provocability and that it isimportant to respond sooner, rather than later. I came to this projectbelieving one should be slow to anger. The results of the computertournament for the Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrate that it is actually betterto respond quickly to a provocation. It turns out that if one waits to respondto uncalled-for defections, there is a risk of sending the wrong signal. Thelonger defections are allowed to go unchallenged, the more likely it is thatthe other player will draw the conclusion that defection can pay. And themore strongly this pattern is established, the harder it will be to break it.The success of simple reciprocity certainly illustrates this point. Byresponding right away, it gives the quickest possible feedback that adefection will not pay.== %%POSTFIX%%The Evolution of Cooperation /* >%%LINK%%[[#^oaw8rvfaq5c|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^oaw8rvfaq5c >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:16:19.721Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:16:19.721Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":15341,"end":15645},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"The speed of response depends upon the time required to detect a givenchoice by the other player. The shorter this time is, the more stablecooperation can be. A rapid detection means that the next move in theinteraction comes quickly, thereby increasing the shadow of the future. ","prefix":"ge as to evoke yet more trouble.","suffix":"Forthis reason, the only arms co"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%ge as to evoke yet more trouble.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==The speed of response depends upon the time required to detect a givenchoice by the other player. The shorter this time is, the more stablecooperation can be. A rapid detection means that the next move in theinteraction comes quickly, thereby increasing the shadow of the future.== %%POSTFIX%%Forthis reason, the only arms co* >%%LINK%%[[#^sgbieo993ic|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^sgbieo993ic >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:19:50.037Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:19:50.037Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":16505,"end":16648},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"n this manner the appreciation of the value of reciprocitybecomes self-reinforcing. Once it gets going, it gets stronger and stronger.","prefix":"city. So wouldeveryone else. I","suffix":"“. . . simple reciprocity succee"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%city. So wouldeveryone else. I%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==n this manner the appreciation of the value of reciprocitybecomes self-reinforcing. Once it gets going, it gets stronger and stronger.== %%POSTFIX%%“. . . simple reciprocity succee* >%%LINK%%[[#^bqlzrw4143h|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^bqlzrw4143h >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:20:20.723Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:20:20.723Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":16655,"end":16809},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"simple reciprocity succeeds without doing better thananyone with whom it interacts. It succeeds by elicitingcooperation from others, not by defeating them","prefix":"ts stronger and stronger.“. . . ","suffix":"”This is the essence of the"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%ts stronger and stronger.“. . .%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==simple reciprocity succeeds without doing better thananyone with whom it interacts. It succeeds by elicitingcooperation from others, not by defeating them== %%POSTFIX%%”This is the essence of the* >%%LINK%%[[#^ql11jlvmgec|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^ql11jlvmgec >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:21:29.865Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:21:29.865Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/z.Attachments/-Papers and books/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":17691,"end":17990},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"Robert Gilpin points out that from the ancient Greeks to contemporaryscholarship all political theory addressed one fundamental question: “Howcan the human race, whether for selfish or more cosmopolitan ends,understand and control the seemingly blind forces of history?” ","prefix":"titiveness to Global Cooperation","suffix":" (3) In thecontemporary world"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%titiveness to Global Cooperation%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==Robert Gilpin points out that from the ancient Greeks to contemporaryscholarship all political theory addressed one fundamental question: “Howcan the human race, whether for selfish or more cosmopolitan ends,understand and control the seemingly blind forces of history?”== %%POSTFIX%%(3) In thecontemporary world* >%%LINK%%[[#^vczmkvm4p5a|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^vczmkvm4p5a >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:28:59.518Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:28:59.518Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":18115,"end":18295},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"Today, the most important problems facing humanity are in the arena ofinternational relations, where independent, egoistic nations face each otherin a state of near anarchy. ","prefix":" development of nuclear weapons.","suffix":"Many of these problems take "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%development of nuclear weapons.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==Today, the most important problems facing humanity are in the arena ofinternational relations, where independent, egoistic nations face each otherin a state of near anarchy.== %%POSTFIX%%Many of these problems take* >%%LINK%%[[#^q11tr7t1gqm|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^q11tr7t1gqm >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:29:10.649Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:29:10.649Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":18480,"end":18720},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"Therefore, the advice to players of the Prisoner’s Dilemma might serveas good advice to national leaders as well: Don’t be envious, don’t be thefirst to defect, reciprocate both cooperation and defection, and don’t be tooclever","prefix":"aining, and military escalation.","suffix":".There is a lesson in the "}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%aining, and military escalation.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==Therefore, the advice to players of the Prisoner’s Dilemma might serveas good advice to national leaders as well: Don’t be envious, don’t be thefirst to defect, reciprocate both cooperation and defection, and don’t be tooclever== %%POSTFIX%%.There is a lesson in the* >%%LINK%%[[#^g3qih2rv2r|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^g3qih2rv2r >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:29:30.120Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:29:30.120Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":18721,"end":18939},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"There is a lesson in the fact that simple reciprocity succeeds withoutdoing better than anyone with whom it interacts. It succeeds by elicitingcooperation from others, not by defeating them.","prefix":"fection, and don’t be tooclever.","suffix":" We are used to thinkingabo"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%fection, and don’t be tooclever.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==There is a lesson in the fact that simple reciprocity succeeds withoutdoing better than anyone with whom it interacts. It succeeds by elicitingcooperation from others, not by defeating them.== %%POSTFIX%%We are used to thinkingabo* >%%LINK%%[[#^kubfmvcsrrh|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^kubfmvcsrrh >%% >```annotation-json >{"created":"2024-01-19T00:29:46.354Z","updated":"2024-01-19T00:29:46.354Z","document":{"title":"Microsoft Word - 185axelrod.doc","link":[{"href":"urn:x-pdf:51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},{"href":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf"}],"documentFingerprint":"51c6225549b730dc277d40cedf249c09"},"uri":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","target":[{"source":"vault:/1-pub/Papers/Robert Axlerod 1984 - The Evolution of Cooperation.pdf","selector":[{"type":"TextPositionSelector","start":18941,"end":19319},{"type":"TextQuoteSelector","exact":"We are used to thinkingabout competitions in which there is only one winner, competitions such asfootball or chess. But the world is rarely like that. In a vast range ofsituations, mutual cooperation can be better for both sides than mutualdefection. The key to doing well lies not in overcoming others, but ineliciting their cooperation.","prefix":"rs, not by defeating them. ","suffix":"9References1. Ian Hay, The Firs"}]}]} >``` >%% >*%%PREFIX%%rs, not by defeating them.%%HIGHLIGHT%% ==We are used to thinkingabout competitions in which there is only one winner, competitions such asfootball or chess. But the world is rarely like that. In a vast range ofsituations, mutual cooperation can be better for both sides than mutualdefection. The key to doing well lies not in overcoming others, but ineliciting their cooperation.== %%POSTFIX%%9References1. Ian Hay, The Firs* >%%LINK%%[[#^f7zvqauj2al|show annotation]] >%%COMMENT%% > >%%TAGS%% > ^f7zvqauj2al